2007/08/29
Brazilian controller won't answer questions
Let me ask you, are the controllers going to be the fall guys for an insufficient and badly surfaced runway, out of service planes, an underbudgeted airport system and governmental corner cutting?
A Brazilian air traffic controller accused of making errors that led to that country's most deadly plane crash last fall refused to answer questions about the crash during his criminal trial Tuesday. Click thru to read the article...
A Brazilian air traffic controller accused of making errors that led to that country's most deadly plane crash last fall refused to answer questions about the crash during his criminal trial Tuesday. Click thru to read the article...
2007/08/28
Concrete Alternatives
Alternative to Disaster
Short runways are an unavoidable problem when there is a shortage of land and it is not possible to have the standard 1,000 feet overrun. Judging by the Tam air disaster, not all country's airports have the technology to prevent major aircraft mishaps, technology such as EMAS. EMAS–Engineered Material Arresting Systems–was developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and ESCO (Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation). EMAS acts as a buffer to slow down aircraft that overrun the length of the runway. All it takes is a bed of crushable concrete--cellular cement material that crushes under the weight of an aircraft, resulting in guaranteed deceleration of the aircraft.
Features of Engineered Material Arresting Systems
FAA-approved
Permits reduction of standard RSA
Shortens standard RSA to 600 feet
Meets FAA AC 150/5220-22
Features material customized to each runway's aircraft fleet
After arrestment, ARFF vehicles can easily maneuver on even damaged EMAS surface
Short runways are an unavoidable problem when there is a shortage of land and it is not possible to have the standard 1,000 feet overrun. Judging by the Tam air disaster, not all country's airports have the technology to prevent major aircraft mishaps, technology such as EMAS. EMAS–Engineered Material Arresting Systems–was developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and ESCO (Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation). EMAS acts as a buffer to slow down aircraft that overrun the length of the runway. All it takes is a bed of crushable concrete--cellular cement material that crushes under the weight of an aircraft, resulting in guaranteed deceleration of the aircraft.
Features of Engineered Material Arresting Systems
FAA-approved
Permits reduction of standard RSA
Shortens standard RSA to 600 feet
Meets FAA AC 150/5220-22
Features material customized to each runway's aircraft fleet
After arrestment, ARFF vehicles can easily maneuver on even damaged EMAS surface
EMAS Fact Sheet
For Immediate Release
June 15, 2007
Contact: Marcia Adams
Phone: (202) 267-3488
Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS)
Background
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that commercial airports, regulated under Part 139 safety rules, have a standard Runway Safety Area (RSA) where possible. At most commercial airports the RSA is 500 feet wide and extends 1000 feet beyond each end of the runway. The FAA has this requirement in the event that an aircraft overruns, undershoots, or veers off the side of the runway. The most dangerous of these incidents are overruns, but since many airports were built before the 1000-foot RSA length was adopted some 20 years ago, the area beyond the end of the runway is where many airports cannot achieve the full standard RSA. This is due to obstacles such as bodies of water, highways, railroads, and populated areas or severe drop-off of terrain.
The FAA has a high-priority program to enhance safety by upgrading the RSAs at commercial airports and provide federal funding to support those upgrades. However, it still may not be practical for some airports to achieve the standard RSA. The FAA, knowing that it would be difficult to achieve a standard RSA at every airport, began conducting research in the 1990s to determine how to ensure maximum safety at airports where the full RSA cannot be obtained. Working in concert with the University of Dayton, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and the Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation (ESCO) of Logan Township, NJ, a new technology emerged to provide an added measure of safety. An Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS) uses materials of closely controlled strength and density placed at the end of a runway to stop or greatly slow an aircraft that overruns the runway. The best material found to date is a lightweight, crushable concrete. When an aircraft rolls into an EMAS arrestor bed, the tires of the aircraft sink into the lightweight concrete and the aircraft is decelerated by having to roll through the material.
Benefits of the EMAS Technology
The EMAS technology provides safety benefits in cases where land is not available, where it would be very expensive for the airport sponsor to buy the land off the end of the runway, or where it is otherwise not possible to have the standard 1,000-foot overrun. This technology is now in place at 18 airports with installation under contract at six additional airports. A standard EMAS installation extends 600 feet from the end of the runway. An EMAS arrestor bed can still be installed to help slow or stop an aircraft that overruns the runway, even if less than 600 feet of land is available.
Current FAA Initiatives
The Office of Airports prepared an RSA improvement plan for the runways at approximately 575 commercial airports in 2005. This plan allows the agency to track the progress and to direct federal funds for making all practicable improvements, including the use of EMAS technology.
Presently, the EMAS system developed by ESCO using crushable concrete is the only system that meets the FAA standard. However, FAA is conducting research through the Airport Cooperative Research Program (project number 07-03) that will examine alternatives to the existing approved system. The results of this effort are expected in 2009. More information on the project can be found at the Transportation Research Board website at http://www.trb.org/CRP/ACRP/ACRP.asp.
EMAS Arrestments
To date, there have been four incidents where the technology has worked successfully to keep aircraft from overrunning the runway and in several cases has prevented injury to passengers and damage to the aircraft.
- May 1999: A Saab 340 commuter aircraft overran the runway at JFK
- May 2003: Gemini Cargo MD-11 was safely decelerated at JFK
- January 2005: A Boeing 747 overran the runway at JFK
- July 2006: Mystere Falcon 900 airplane ran off the runway at the Greenville Downtown Airport in South Carolina
EMAS Installations
Currently, EMAS is installed at 24 runway ends at 19 airports in the United States. With plans to install 12 additional EMAS systems at seven more U.S. airports.
| Airport | Location | # of Systems | Installation Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JFK International | Jamaica, NY | 1 | 1996 |
| Minneapolis St. Paul | Minneapolis, MN | 1 | 1999 |
| Little Rock | Little Rock, AR | 2 | 2000/2003 |
| Rochester International | Rochester, NY | 1 | 2001 |
| Burbank | Burbank, CA | 1 | 2002 |
| Baton Rouge Metropolitan | Baton Rouge, LA | 1 | 2002 |
| Greater Binghamton | Binghamton, NY | 2 | 2002 |
| Greenville Downtown | Greensville, SC | 1 | 2003 |
| Barnstable Municipal | Hyannis, MA | 1 | 2003 |
| Roanoke Regional | Roanoke, VA | 1 | 2004 |
| Fort Lauderdale International | Fort Lauderdale, FL | 2 | 2004 |
| Dutchess County | Poughkeepsie, NY | 1 | 2004 |
| LaGuardia | Flushing, NY | 2 | 2005 |
| Boston Logan | Boston, MA | 2 | 2005/2006 |
| Laredo International | Laredo, TX | 1 | 2006 |
| San Diego International | San Diego, CA | 1 | 2006 |
| Teterboro | Teterboro , NJ | 1 | 2006 |
| Chicago Midway | Chicago, IL | 1 | 2006 |
| Merle K (Mudhole) Smith | Cordova, AK | 1 | 2007 |
Additional Projects Currently Under Contract
| Location | # of Systems | Expected Installation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Charleston, WV | 1 | June 2007 |
| Chicago Midway | 3 | Spring/Summer 2007 |
| Wilkes-Barre Scranton, PA | 1 | Fall 2007 |
| JFK International | 1 | Fall 2007 |
| Chicago O’Hare | 2 | Spring 2008 |
| Telluride, CO | 2 | TBD |
| Manchester, NH | 1 | Spring 2008 |
| Newark Liberty, NJ | 1 | Spring 2008 |
2007/08/27
Pilot Error Suspected
Sources Close to Probe Say Engine Wasn't Idled
Authorities believe pilot error caused the tragedy. If confirmed, it would cast doubt that poor runway conditions were to blame.
Pilots had programmed the computerized engine controls -- similar to a car's cruise-control system -- to maintain a speed of about 150 mph. When the plane was about 30 feet off the ground, the pilots correctly switched one of the engines to idle, but did not do so with the other engine. When the plane was braked, the second engine attempted to accelerate to maintain the preset speed.
One of the airplane's thrust reversers, a device used to slow the aircraft, was broken but the manufacturer claims plane is safe to fly with a disabled reverser.
However, it has long been claimed that the short runway at Congonhas is unsafe in rainy conditions. The runway has been the site of problem landings before, and was even closed briefly this year, by court order.
Air traffic controllers fear that government officials will use reports of pilot error to excuse themselves from making further improvements to the air safety system.
Authorities believe pilot error caused the tragedy. If confirmed, it would cast doubt that poor runway conditions were to blame.
Pilots had programmed the computerized engine controls -- similar to a car's cruise-control system -- to maintain a speed of about 150 mph. When the plane was about 30 feet off the ground, the pilots correctly switched one of the engines to idle, but did not do so with the other engine. When the plane was braked, the second engine attempted to accelerate to maintain the preset speed.
One of the airplane's thrust reversers, a device used to slow the aircraft, was broken but the manufacturer claims plane is safe to fly with a disabled reverser.
However, it has long been claimed that the short runway at Congonhas is unsafe in rainy conditions. The runway has been the site of problem landings before, and was even closed briefly this year, by court order.
Air traffic controllers fear that government officials will use reports of pilot error to excuse themselves from making further improvements to the air safety system.
Airbus says no evidence of plane fault
A representative for the European aircraft manufacturer told the Brazilian Congress, "We don't see any indication of a fault."
A TAM airline Airbus 320 overran the runway while landing at Sao Paulo's Congonhas airport crossed a road and slammed into an airport building, and exploded on July 17.
Available data shows the aircraft's brakes functioned correctly.
But the representative said that one of the engine's throttles was in the 'climb' position.
The plane was also operating with only one of of its two thrust reversers, which are used to help brake the plane upon landing.
A TAM airline Airbus 320 overran the runway while landing at Sao Paulo's Congonhas airport crossed a road and slammed into an airport building, and exploded on July 17.
Available data shows the aircraft's brakes functioned correctly.
But the representative said that one of the engine's throttles was in the 'climb' position.
The plane was also operating with only one of of its two thrust reversers, which are used to help brake the plane upon landing.
Sao Paulo International Airport's Runway Closed
Sao Paulo International Airport's main runway will remain closed fortwo months while construction crews rebuild the tarmac to improve safety. 13 million reais ($6.4 million) will be spent to repave the runway, Infraero announced on its Web site. The repaved runway will have grooves to prevent water from accumulating on the tarmac.
2007/08/16
Q&A: Sao Paulo plane crash
Follow this link to a knowledgeable article question/answer session by Tim Robinson from Aerospace International regarding the Sao Paulo plane crash
Or see the crash timeline.
Or see the crash timeline.
2007/08/11
No 'Errors' In Sao Paulo, Brazil Plane Crash
Mechanical or other failures were not responsible for the crash of a Brazilian airliner that killed 199 people in July, a report released Thursday said.
The report, presented to Brazilian lawmakers, came from the manufacturers of the Airbus that crashed at Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, O Globo TV reported.
However, the same congressional panel that heard the findings by Airbus determined last week that a misaligned engine throttle was likely the cause of the crash.
REposted from: http://www.postchronicle.com/news/breakingnews/article_21296833.shtml
The report, presented to Brazilian lawmakers, came from the manufacturers of the Airbus that crashed at Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, O Globo TV reported.
However, the same congressional panel that heard the findings by Airbus determined last week that a misaligned engine throttle was likely the cause of the crash.
REposted from: http://www.postchronicle.com/news/breakingnews/article_21296833.shtml
The Cost of Cheap Air Travel
Hindsight is teaching Brazil some hard lessons. Some uncomfortable things are coming to light, like how the warning signs have been ignored. There's a long trail of complaints about Brazilian aviation from the people in the system--(air traffic controllers, pilots, airport employees, etc.) that urgent major improvements were needed went ignored.
Airline safety relies on government-provided infrastructure. To put it simply, you can not skimp on airports. Things like long runways, grooved surfaces, overruns, planned SAFE approaches. Brazil dragging its feet is what killed nearly 200 people, no matter what the investigation says.
Airports need standards, and standards need to be enforced. Would the accident have happened on a longer runway that was properly surfaced? The pilots did NOT skid off the end of the runway. When they couldn't stop, the pilots decided t get airborne again.
The mechanics of landing
When landing, a jet gets the main wheels onto the runway, which takes up 1000 or more feet of runway.
The pilot deploys the speed brake lever, then pulls the throttles into reverse thrust. This takes up runway at the rate of 200 feet per second.
So what happens when the jet brakes and the pilot realises it is too slick to stop? The pilot must get the engines back max power--was there adequate time and space for the Airbus to do this? Obviously not.
Are we following in Brazil's footsteps?
The FAA is asking Congress to pawn off federal funding responsibilities for a national system through "user fees" (as our current FAA administrator has asked Congress to do).
Our amazing safety record comes from not skimping, not searching for cost-cutting measures. Will we continue to set the world safety standard or not? Only time will tell.
Airline safety relies on government-provided infrastructure. To put it simply, you can not skimp on airports. Things like long runways, grooved surfaces, overruns, planned SAFE approaches. Brazil dragging its feet is what killed nearly 200 people, no matter what the investigation says.
Airports need standards, and standards need to be enforced. Would the accident have happened on a longer runway that was properly surfaced? The pilots did NOT skid off the end of the runway. When they couldn't stop, the pilots decided t get airborne again.
The mechanics of landing
When landing, a jet gets the main wheels onto the runway, which takes up 1000 or more feet of runway.
The pilot deploys the speed brake lever, then pulls the throttles into reverse thrust. This takes up runway at the rate of 200 feet per second.
So what happens when the jet brakes and the pilot realises it is too slick to stop? The pilot must get the engines back max power--was there adequate time and space for the Airbus to do this? Obviously not.
Are we following in Brazil's footsteps?
The FAA is asking Congress to pawn off federal funding responsibilities for a national system through "user fees" (as our current FAA administrator has asked Congress to do).
Our amazing safety record comes from not skimping, not searching for cost-cutting measures. Will we continue to set the world safety standard or not? Only time will tell.
2007/08/10
Infraero Oversight
Infraero, the airport authority, owns and operates Brazil's commercial airports and has been overseeing Congonhas. Rainwater acumulating on the tarmac is a big issue for them, as it causes landing planes to skid. It's such a big problem that the airport shut 18 times in the first quarter from flooded runways. Even before the accident, the short runway where the Tam Airbus skidded and crashed was scheduled to be retextured to handle water, but had been declared open for use in spite of not being properly surfaced to handle rain.
It was raining in Sao Paulo again yesterday.
Rescue workers have removed 173 badly charred bodies. The three story Tam Cargo center that was hit housed about 55 employees. Of those employees, three were killed, 11 were injured. and five are missing.
The word from officials investigating the crash is that the pilot attempted to take off when he realized the plane couldn't stop.
An emergency meeting of congress was called to discuss the crash.
Dental records are being used to help identify the victims who are charred beyond recognition. All that remains of the airbus is the plane's red tail fin.
It is common knowledge that the runways at Congonhas are too short.
A witness said, "We heard a loud skidding noise and saw the plane cross another lane very quickly, and then the plane disappeared. I felt the heat of the fire ball in my face. The fire was as big as a 25-story building.''
Witnesses feared the fire might trigger other explosions.
The plane's black box is under investigation.
The company producing the Airbus is based in Toulouse, France, a subsidiary of European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co.
It has been revealed that that particular plane had logged about 20,000 flight hours in 9,300 flights, and was powered by International Aero Engines' engines.
The leader of the opposition in the lower house of congress, Julio Redecker, was one of the passengers.
Ten months ago, a Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA passenger plane collided in mid-air with a business jet over the Amazon, killing 154 people.
It was raining in Sao Paulo again yesterday.
Rescue workers have removed 173 badly charred bodies. The three story Tam Cargo center that was hit housed about 55 employees. Of those employees, three were killed, 11 were injured. and five are missing.
The word from officials investigating the crash is that the pilot attempted to take off when he realized the plane couldn't stop.
An emergency meeting of congress was called to discuss the crash.
Dental records are being used to help identify the victims who are charred beyond recognition. All that remains of the airbus is the plane's red tail fin.
It is common knowledge that the runways at Congonhas are too short.
A witness said, "We heard a loud skidding noise and saw the plane cross another lane very quickly, and then the plane disappeared. I felt the heat of the fire ball in my face. The fire was as big as a 25-story building.''
Witnesses feared the fire might trigger other explosions.
The plane's black box is under investigation.
The company producing the Airbus is based in Toulouse, France, a subsidiary of European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co.
It has been revealed that that particular plane had logged about 20,000 flight hours in 9,300 flights, and was powered by International Aero Engines' engines.
The leader of the opposition in the lower house of congress, Julio Redecker, was one of the passengers.
Ten months ago, a Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA passenger plane collided in mid-air with a business jet over the Amazon, killing 154 people.
2007/08/09
What Is Sauce for the Goose is Sauce for the Gander
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva flies with a smart crew. They know it's too dangerous, so the jet he's on is not allowed to fly with one of its reverse thrusters deactivated. If it is not safe enough for him, why doesn't the safety regulation apply to commercial flights such as the TAM airliner that crashed and killed 199 people last month? Isn't it just as dangerous for them too?
The regulation that applies to Silva's plane is " a security rule for transporting the nation's highest executive. "Air force commander Brig. Juniti Saito told a congressional panel during the investigation.
The problem is that one of the reverse thrusters used to slow the planes down during landings — was deactivated on that terribleTAM Airbus A320 crash. TAM Linhas Aereas SA said that according to government-approved safety measures. the plane was safe to fly.
Tell that to the nearly 200 fatalities of the crash: all 187 aboard plus 12 people on the ground.
Speculation as to the cause is currently focused the notoriously short. slick runway and the possibility that the jet's throttles were set in the wrong position.
Congresswoman Luciana Genro said, "It's obvious that no human life is less important than the life of the president of the Republic. The air force should try to stop Airbuses from flying with the reverse thruster deactivated."
The regulation that applies to Silva's plane is " a security rule for transporting the nation's highest executive. "Air force commander Brig. Juniti Saito told a congressional panel during the investigation.
The problem is that one of the reverse thrusters used to slow the planes down during landings — was deactivated on that terribleTAM Airbus A320 crash. TAM Linhas Aereas SA said that according to government-approved safety measures. the plane was safe to fly.
Tell that to the nearly 200 fatalities of the crash: all 187 aboard plus 12 people on the ground.
Speculation as to the cause is currently focused the notoriously short. slick runway and the possibility that the jet's throttles were set in the wrong position.
Congresswoman Luciana Genro said, "It's obvious that no human life is less important than the life of the president of the Republic. The air force should try to stop Airbuses from flying with the reverse thruster deactivated."
2007/08/07
Brazil Seizes Flight Control Data
According to the Tam Airlines transcript, the pilots panicked, crying "Oh my God!, Oh my God!" as they tried to slow down the jetliner which landed with inoperable spoilers and a thrust reverser.
"Come on! Come on! Turn, turn, turn, turn!" cried the co-pilot moments before a final utterance, "Oh no!," was heard. The tape goes blank as the jetliner slammed into a cargo building at 137 mph and exploded.
In the wake of the airliner crash in Sao Paulo last month, Brazil's top prosecutor Matheus Baraldi Magnan, seized records from key flight control centers in response to concern over Brazil's civil aviation system.
Explaining the surprise data impoundment, Magnani said the military hindered his seizure, and "holds on to the information. It is not possible today to know the extent and frequency of problems. Only with that information will it be possible to evaluate and improve the system...The goal is to assure seizure of the incident records, and any information about problems in the air traffic control system, which will allow us to assess the risks passengers and crew face aboard aircraft."
The government confirmed that France and aircraft builder Airbus filed a complaint over leaks of the Tam airlines flight's black box.
The French bureau's response on August third was that "All sorts of information, correct or incorrect, is circulating, along with speculation and attempts at explanations."
"It is a serious error to try to draw conclusions on the basis of incomplete and unanalyzed information."
A transcript of the cockpit voice recorder was released last week by a congressional committee investigating the accident on.
July 17 when the TAM Airbus 320 carrying 187 people overran the runway while landing at Sao Paulo's Congonhas airport, crossed a road and slammed into an airport building.
"Come on! Come on! Turn, turn, turn, turn!" cried the co-pilot moments before a final utterance, "Oh no!," was heard. The tape goes blank as the jetliner slammed into a cargo building at 137 mph and exploded.
In the wake of the airliner crash in Sao Paulo last month, Brazil's top prosecutor Matheus Baraldi Magnan, seized records from key flight control centers in response to concern over Brazil's civil aviation system.
Explaining the surprise data impoundment, Magnani said the military hindered his seizure, and "holds on to the information. It is not possible today to know the extent and frequency of problems. Only with that information will it be possible to evaluate and improve the system...The goal is to assure seizure of the incident records, and any information about problems in the air traffic control system, which will allow us to assess the risks passengers and crew face aboard aircraft."
The government confirmed that France and aircraft builder Airbus filed a complaint over leaks of the Tam airlines flight's black box.
The French bureau's response on August third was that "All sorts of information, correct or incorrect, is circulating, along with speculation and attempts at explanations."
"It is a serious error to try to draw conclusions on the basis of incomplete and unanalyzed information."
A transcript of the cockpit voice recorder was released last week by a congressional committee investigating the accident on.
July 17 when the TAM Airbus 320 carrying 187 people overran the runway while landing at Sao Paulo's Congonhas airport, crossed a road and slammed into an airport building.
Brazil Air
"How many people will be killed before the Brazilian government stops the [air force's] live experiments on the travelling public's safety?" said Marc Baumgartner, the president of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers.
Brazil is rethinking its flight patterns
Across the country, frustrated passengers whose flights have been delayed or cancelled are rioting due to the long lines in Brazil's airports. Underpaid and understaffed air traffic controllers are at the hub of a logistical nightmare. More than 10 government agencies oversee aviation.
Baumgartner accused the Brazilian government of "chasing scapegoats" among the Brazilian air traffic controllers instead of "re-engineering the necessary safety oversight and risk assessment to prevent Brazilian civil aviation from falling into deeper chaos."
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promised to get tough on safety and build a new airport in São Paulo to ease congestion. "Our aviation system, in spite of the investments we have made in the expansion and modernization of almost all Brazilian airports, is passing through difficulties." To ease the pressure, several measures are planned like bans on charter, cargo and executive flights to Congonhas. The question is what pressure will such changes actually ease: the stressed airport system, or the government taking the heat for the stressed airport system?
Aviation experts say that the Airbus 320 that crashed at Congonhas was too large for the airport's short runways, that the runway was not textured properly and part of the plane's supplementary braking system was not working. Last February, a federal judge prohibited the landing large types of aircraft at the airport, including Fokker 100, Boeing 737-800 and Boeing 737-700.
Carlos Gilberto Salvador Camacho, director of flight security for the National Union of Pilots, tokd a São Paulo newspaper last week. "There is subliminal pressure from the commercial airlines that if you don't land there you are somehow hurting the companies that rely on their revenues from the passengers."
"What exploded at Congonhas was not just the TAM jet and its almost 200 victims, but the credibility of the Brazilian system of civil aviation. Ten months ago, the country felt the impact of the worst disaster in its history of civil aviation, an incident which lifted the veil off the chaos in the industry, and we completely ignored it." wrote Cezar Britto, the national president of the Order of Brazilian Lawyers after the Congonhas crash.
Brazil is rethinking its flight patterns
Across the country, frustrated passengers whose flights have been delayed or cancelled are rioting due to the long lines in Brazil's airports. Underpaid and understaffed air traffic controllers are at the hub of a logistical nightmare. More than 10 government agencies oversee aviation.
Baumgartner accused the Brazilian government of "chasing scapegoats" among the Brazilian air traffic controllers instead of "re-engineering the necessary safety oversight and risk assessment to prevent Brazilian civil aviation from falling into deeper chaos."
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promised to get tough on safety and build a new airport in São Paulo to ease congestion. "Our aviation system, in spite of the investments we have made in the expansion and modernization of almost all Brazilian airports, is passing through difficulties." To ease the pressure, several measures are planned like bans on charter, cargo and executive flights to Congonhas. The question is what pressure will such changes actually ease: the stressed airport system, or the government taking the heat for the stressed airport system?
Aviation experts say that the Airbus 320 that crashed at Congonhas was too large for the airport's short runways, that the runway was not textured properly and part of the plane's supplementary braking system was not working. Last February, a federal judge prohibited the landing large types of aircraft at the airport, including Fokker 100, Boeing 737-800 and Boeing 737-700.
Carlos Gilberto Salvador Camacho, director of flight security for the National Union of Pilots, tokd a São Paulo newspaper last week. "There is subliminal pressure from the commercial airlines that if you don't land there you are somehow hurting the companies that rely on their revenues from the passengers."
"What exploded at Congonhas was not just the TAM jet and its almost 200 victims, but the credibility of the Brazilian system of civil aviation. Ten months ago, the country felt the impact of the worst disaster in its history of civil aviation, an incident which lifted the veil off the chaos in the industry, and we completely ignored it." wrote Cezar Britto, the national president of the Order of Brazilian Lawyers after the Congonhas crash.
2007/08/05
Tam Air Crash Lawsuit
A complaint filed by his family on behalf of Ricardo Tazoe, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, also names European jet manufacturer Airbus, the Goodrich Corp, and International Aero Engines (IAE) as defendants. The Miami resident died in an Airbus crash in Sao Paulo.
198 other people who were killed when the Tam Airbus A320 skidded off a rainy runway at Sao Paulo's Congonhas Airport.
TAM is charged with negligence. The plane should have been grounded because one of its thrust reversers was not working. Defendants include Goodrich, the manufacturer of the aircraft's braking system and IAE, which assembled the plane's engine.
"From the evidence gathered so far, it's clear that TAM knew there were problems with the aircraft," Steven C. Marks, an attorney at Miami law firm Podhurst Orseck, said in the statement. "Had (the thrust reverser) been operational, it may have prevented this accident."
The lawsuit seeks unspecified financial damages.
IAE is United Technologies Corp. Pratt & Whitney, Britain's Rolls-Royce Plc, Japan's Aero Engines Corp. and Germany's MTU Aero Engones.
The firm that filed the suit is also representing several families in a suit concerning an earlier crash in the Amazon this year.
198 other people who were killed when the Tam Airbus A320 skidded off a rainy runway at Sao Paulo's Congonhas Airport.
TAM is charged with negligence. The plane should have been grounded because one of its thrust reversers was not working. Defendants include Goodrich, the manufacturer of the aircraft's braking system and IAE, which assembled the plane's engine.
"From the evidence gathered so far, it's clear that TAM knew there were problems with the aircraft," Steven C. Marks, an attorney at Miami law firm Podhurst Orseck, said in the statement. "Had (the thrust reverser) been operational, it may have prevented this accident."
The lawsuit seeks unspecified financial damages.
IAE is United Technologies Corp. Pratt & Whitney, Britain's Rolls-Royce Plc, Japan's Aero Engines Corp. and Germany's MTU Aero Engones.
The firm that filed the suit is also representing several families in a suit concerning an earlier crash in the Amazon this year.
2007/08/04
Fired: Head of Brazil airport authority
Jose Carlos Pereira, the head of Infraero (Brazil's airport authority) will be replaced, the second official to be fired because of the worst plane crash in Brazil's history. The president fired Defense Minister Waldir Pires on July 25 and brought in former Supreme Court Chief Justice Nelson Jobim to overhaul the country's ailing aviation. The defense ministry supervises civil aviation in Brazil.
The TAM crash is actually the second major plane crash in Brazil in 10 months. In September, 154 people were killed when a Boeing 737 clipped wings in mid-air with a private jet and crashed in the Amazon jungle.
The replacement is Sergio Gaudenzi, head of the Brazilian Space Agency. An official announcement is not expected until Monday.
Pereira has been under pressure to step down since the Airbus A320 crash. 187 people aboard the TAM flight and 12 on the ground were killed in the accident The crash caused a national outcry for improvement in air safety.
Gaudenzi's first task will be to restore normalcy at Brazilian airports.In Brazil that many passengers are now canceling flights and taking buses instead.
Many travelers avoid Brazil altogether.
The TAM crash is actually the second major plane crash in Brazil in 10 months. In September, 154 people were killed when a Boeing 737 clipped wings in mid-air with a private jet and crashed in the Amazon jungle.
The replacement is Sergio Gaudenzi, head of the Brazilian Space Agency. An official announcement is not expected until Monday.
Pereira has been under pressure to step down since the Airbus A320 crash. 187 people aboard the TAM flight and 12 on the ground were killed in the accident The crash caused a national outcry for improvement in air safety.
Gaudenzi's first task will be to restore normalcy at Brazilian airports.In Brazil that many passengers are now canceling flights and taking buses instead.
Many travelers avoid Brazil altogether.
2007/08/03
Radar Failure
Radar failure over the Amazon is just one among a host of problems plaguing Brazil's suffering aviation industry. The failure forced Brazilian and International flights to ground or to turn back. This from the country that sent a piece of the fuselage off thinking it was the flight recorder.
The radar was out from midnight until 2:30 am, and caused by an electrical problem. Travellers found themselves trapped in airports, unable to catch flights home. There was mass confusion in spite of the president's speech primishing safety measures.
"Our aviation system, in spite of the investments we have made in expansion and modernization of almost all Brazilian airports, is passing through difficulties,'' Silva said. ``The security of our aviation system is compatible with all the international standards. We cannot lose sight of this.''
A new airport location will be chosen within 90 days but will take five years to build and is not a high priority. Congonhas, the nation's busiest airport, has a slick, short runway considered a likely factor in the crash of the TAM flight that killed nearly 200 people; and the planned repair and remediation does have priority. The crash was the country's worst disaster until Tuesday's accident and it exposed widespread problems with the country's air traffic control system.
Analysis of the recorded conversations should be available within a few weeks.
The radar was out from midnight until 2:30 am, and caused by an electrical problem. Travellers found themselves trapped in airports, unable to catch flights home. There was mass confusion in spite of the president's speech primishing safety measures.
"Our aviation system, in spite of the investments we have made in expansion and modernization of almost all Brazilian airports, is passing through difficulties,'' Silva said. ``The security of our aviation system is compatible with all the international standards. We cannot lose sight of this.''
A new airport location will be chosen within 90 days but will take five years to build and is not a high priority. Congonhas, the nation's busiest airport, has a slick, short runway considered a likely factor in the crash of the TAM flight that killed nearly 200 people; and the planned repair and remediation does have priority. The crash was the country's worst disaster until Tuesday's accident and it exposed widespread problems with the country's air traffic control system.
Analysis of the recorded conversations should be available within a few weeks.
Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript
CAM - Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
HOT - Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
PA - Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
FWC - Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
RDO - Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
APP - Radio transmission from Approach Control
TWR - Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
CH2 - sound heard on CVR channel 2
-1 - Voice identified as the captain/PIC
-2 - Voice identified as the first Officer/SIC
-3 - Voice identified as a Flight Attendant
-? - Voice unidentified
* - Unintelligible word
# - Expletive
@ - Non-pertinent word
( ) - Questionable insertion
[ ] - Editorial insertion
Start Of Transcript
18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
[start of recording]
18:18:24.5
PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
18:18:53.4
CAM - ? [sound of whistling]
18:20:25.0
CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
18:20:28.1
CAM - 1 is ok?
18:20:29.7
CAM - 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
18:20:33.3
CAM -1 I have just informed.
18:20:34.7
CAM - 3 I didn’t hear - sorry -her talking.
18:20:37.7
CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
18:20:39.3
CAM - 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
18:43:04.3
HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
18:43:06.9
HOT-2 yes… only the left.
18:43:24.0
HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
18:43:26.6
HOT-2 checked.
18:43:27.1
HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
18:43:29.4
HOT-1 flaps one.
18:43:30.7
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:43:36.7
HOT-1 clear status.
18:43:41.8
HOT-2 clear status.
18:43:43.8
HOT-2 clear.
18:43:48.2
RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
18:43:52.2
APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
18:44:00.0
RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
18:44:01.7
HOT-1 good afternoon.
18:44:06.4
HOT-1 flaps two.
18:44:08.01
CAM-2 speed checked.
18:44:20.0
HOT-2 flaps at two.
18:44:22.3
RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
18:44:26.01
TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
18:44:33.4
RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
18:44:36.3
HOT-1 landing gear down.
18:44:37.7
HOT-2 landing gear down.
18:44:53.9
HOT-1 flaps three.
18:44:55.1
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:44:57.4
HOT-2 flaps three.
18:45:03.9
HOT-1 flap full.
18:45:05.7
CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
18:45:10.6
HOT-1 standby final checklist
18:45:12.0
HOT-2 standing by.
18:45:12.9
CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
18:45:15.0
CAM-2 ALT**.
18:45:21.0
CAM-2 six thousand feet.
18:45:44.0
CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
18:45:52.1
CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
18:46:03.2
HOT-1 final checklist.
18:46:04.6
HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
18:46:10.4
PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
18:46: 14.0
CAM- 2 cabin crew
18:46:15.2
CAM – 1 advised.
18:46:16.00
CAM – 2 auto thrust.
18:46:18. 8
CAM 1 – speed.
18:46:20.0
CAM 2 - **-
18:46:21.1
CAM 1 – landing no blue.
18:46:22.6
CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
18:46:23.8
HOT-1 landing, no blue
18:46:24.9
HOT-2 landing no blue.
18:46:26.1
HOT-1 okay?
18:46: 26.7
HOT-2 okay..what?
18:46:28.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:46:30.8
HOT-? *-
18:46:30.8
HOT-2 final checklist complete.
18:46:33.8
CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
18:46:41.7
CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
18:46: 57.0
RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
18:47:01.7
TWR it’s wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
18:47:06.1
RDO-2 already on final.
18:47:07.5
TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
18:47:10.7
HOT-1 wet and slippery!
18:47:22.0
HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
18:47: 34.3
TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
18:47:40.6
HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
18:47:42.9
HOT-1 checked.
18:47:43.9
TWR three zero five four?
18:47:45.3
RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
18:47:46.4
FWC four hundred.
18:47:49.8
HOT-1 is the landing clear?
18:47:50.7
HOT-2 clear to land.
18:47:52.3
HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
18:47:53.7
CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
18:47:54.1
HOT-2 checked.
18:47:54.8
HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
18:47:55.7
CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
18:47:56.9
HOT-2 what?
18:47:58.8
FWC three hundred.
18:47:59.3
HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
18:48:00.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:48:03.0
HOT-2 inhibit.
18:48:05.8
HOT-2 middle.
18:48:11.6
FWC two hundred.
18:48:14.9
HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
18:48: 16.8
HOT-1 okay.
18:48:21.0
FWC twenty.
18:48:21.6
FWC retard.
18:48:23.0
FWC retard.
18:48:24.5
CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
18:48:24.9
CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
18:48:25:5
GPWS retard.
18:48:26:3
CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
18:48:26:7
HOT-2 reverse number one only.
18:48:29:5
HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
18:48:30:8
HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
18:48:33:3
HOT-1 look this.
18:48:34:4
HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
18:48:35:9
HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
18:48:40:0
HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
18:48:42:7
HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
18:48:44:6
HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
18:48:45:5
CAM [sound of crushing noises].
18:48:49:7
CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
18:48:50:0
CAM [pause in crushing noises]
18:48:50:6
CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
18:48:50:8
CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
[end of recording]
18:48:51:4
HOT - Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
PA - Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
FWC - Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
RDO - Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
APP - Radio transmission from Approach Control
TWR - Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
CH2 - sound heard on CVR channel 2
-1 - Voice identified as the captain/PIC
-2 - Voice identified as the first Officer/SIC
-3 - Voice identified as a Flight Attendant
-? - Voice unidentified
* - Unintelligible word
# - Expletive
@ - Non-pertinent word
( ) - Questionable insertion
[ ] - Editorial insertion
Start Of Transcript
18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
[start of recording]
18:18:24.5
PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
18:18:53.4
CAM - ? [sound of whistling]
18:20:25.0
CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
18:20:28.1
CAM - 1 is ok?
18:20:29.7
CAM - 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
18:20:33.3
CAM -1 I have just informed.
18:20:34.7
CAM - 3 I didn’t hear - sorry -her talking.
18:20:37.7
CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
18:20:39.3
CAM - 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
18:43:04.3
HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
18:43:06.9
HOT-2 yes… only the left.
18:43:24.0
HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
18:43:26.6
HOT-2 checked.
18:43:27.1
HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
18:43:29.4
HOT-1 flaps one.
18:43:30.7
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:43:36.7
HOT-1 clear status.
18:43:41.8
HOT-2 clear status.
18:43:43.8
HOT-2 clear.
18:43:48.2
RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
18:43:52.2
APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
18:44:00.0
RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
18:44:01.7
HOT-1 good afternoon.
18:44:06.4
HOT-1 flaps two.
18:44:08.01
CAM-2 speed checked.
18:44:20.0
HOT-2 flaps at two.
18:44:22.3
RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
18:44:26.01
TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
18:44:33.4
RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
18:44:36.3
HOT-1 landing gear down.
18:44:37.7
HOT-2 landing gear down.
18:44:53.9
HOT-1 flaps three.
18:44:55.1
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:44:57.4
HOT-2 flaps three.
18:45:03.9
HOT-1 flap full.
18:45:05.7
CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
18:45:10.6
HOT-1 standby final checklist
18:45:12.0
HOT-2 standing by.
18:45:12.9
CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
18:45:15.0
CAM-2 ALT**.
18:45:21.0
CAM-2 six thousand feet.
18:45:44.0
CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
18:45:52.1
CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
18:46:03.2
HOT-1 final checklist.
18:46:04.6
HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
18:46:10.4
PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
18:46: 14.0
CAM- 2 cabin crew
18:46:15.2
CAM – 1 advised.
18:46:16.00
CAM – 2 auto thrust.
18:46:18. 8
CAM 1 – speed.
18:46:20.0
CAM 2 - **-
18:46:21.1
CAM 1 – landing no blue.
18:46:22.6
CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
18:46:23.8
HOT-1 landing, no blue
18:46:24.9
HOT-2 landing no blue.
18:46:26.1
HOT-1 okay?
18:46: 26.7
HOT-2 okay..what?
18:46:28.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:46:30.8
HOT-? *-
18:46:30.8
HOT-2 final checklist complete.
18:46:33.8
CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
18:46:41.7
CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
18:46: 57.0
RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
18:47:01.7
TWR it’s wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
18:47:06.1
RDO-2 already on final.
18:47:07.5
TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
18:47:10.7
HOT-1 wet and slippery!
18:47:22.0
HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
18:47: 34.3
TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
18:47:40.6
HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
18:47:42.9
HOT-1 checked.
18:47:43.9
TWR three zero five four?
18:47:45.3
RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
18:47:46.4
FWC four hundred.
18:47:49.8
HOT-1 is the landing clear?
18:47:50.7
HOT-2 clear to land.
18:47:52.3
HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
18:47:53.7
CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
18:47:54.1
HOT-2 checked.
18:47:54.8
HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
18:47:55.7
CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
18:47:56.9
HOT-2 what?
18:47:58.8
FWC three hundred.
18:47:59.3
HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
18:48:00.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:48:03.0
HOT-2 inhibit.
18:48:05.8
HOT-2 middle.
18:48:11.6
FWC two hundred.
18:48:14.9
HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
18:48: 16.8
HOT-1 okay.
18:48:21.0
FWC twenty.
18:48:21.6
FWC retard.
18:48:23.0
FWC retard.
18:48:24.5
CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
18:48:24.9
CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
18:48:25:5
GPWS retard.
18:48:26:3
CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
18:48:26:7
HOT-2 reverse number one only.
18:48:29:5
HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
18:48:30:8
HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
18:48:33:3
HOT-1 look this.
18:48:34:4
HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
18:48:35:9
HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
18:48:40:0
HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
18:48:42:7
HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
18:48:44:6
HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
18:48:45:5
CAM [sound of crushing noises].
18:48:49:7
CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
18:48:50:0
CAM [pause in crushing noises]
18:48:50:6
CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
18:48:50:8
CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
[end of recording]
18:48:51:4
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